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I se ldom have the opportunity to philosophize. I talk about the programs 
that we are running , principally the nuclear rocket program. My talk today, how-
ever, will not cover the nuclear rocket program at all. I have been asked to talk 
about NASA ' s philosophy of safe ty; since I don't r ea lly know what that is, I ' ll 
give you my own philosophy . Ce rtainly for my programs i t represents the project 
philosophy. Where I can, I'll include NASA examples. 
The philosophy of nuclear safety in aerospace systems is, to me, just like 
the philosophy used in the development of any space system in which human life may 
be involved , whether it be human life in the vehicle itself or the effects that may 
be felt on the ground. The main point must be that the system will be as reliable 
as possible; its operation must be assured. We would like 100 percent reliability. 
I think the main effort must be in ensuring that the system will work as de-
signed . In add ition, we believe that even when we do everything possible to make 
it work as we intend, we ass ume that something will go wrong and design appropriate 
countermeasures. I think we can develop a system that really is reliable, one with 
a negligible probability of abort and damage. I will later indicate some examples 
to show that such systems do exist in the space program, as established by the rec-
ord of space flights . 
I also believe we can develop reliable countermeasures. My real worry, how-
ever, i s that countermeasures may make the basic system unreliable and may make it 
almost impossible to operate the system satisfactorily. This is where the judgment 
that Mr. DiLuzio talked about enters. I have seen many countermeasure gadge ts that 
we could add to nuclear rockets and nuclear electric power systems which would, I 
am afraid, make it impossible for the basic system to operate successfully. At 
some point, tradeoffs must be made to optimize overall safety. I believe it has to 
come at the beginning of the development program and be integrated throughout the 
program. 
Eve rythin g I have talked about so far--development of the system and develop-
ment of the countermeasures - -is, to my way of thinking , a project responsibility . 
It is up to the people who are developing the system to handle these responsibili-
ties. Only the project people can make the design decisions and tradeoffs to 
ensure overall safety and reliability . Over and above this, we get what is usually 
referred to as an independent review. As Mr. DiLuzio pointed out, it is frequently 
difficult to get such a review, but we try. This independent review hardly ever 
does, or should, dig into the development program of the system to determine whether 
the system will operate successfully . What it looks at are the countermeasures, 
which, of course, we hope are never used. Thus, it looks at only a small part of 
the overall problem. My concern is that a review may be so independent that its 
only purpose is to say, "No, there is something you haven't looked at, and until 
you look at it we won't let you fly ." I think the project has a responsibility to 
be as objective as it can, to point out every trouble, to force itself to be aware 
of the problems it may run into, and to explain these and discuss them with anybody 
who wants to know about them so that it may objectively make a responsible decision 
on the safe operation of the system . I am frankly concerned, however, that both 
the countermeasures and a too - independent review ~ay reduce the likelihood of suc-
cessful operation and application of nuclear systems in space . 
-, 
33 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19640004641 2020-03-24T06:37:10+00:00Z
34 
1-2 
I'd like now to discuss how we go about getting a system to operate succe ss -
fully. We have, I think, several examples of the kind of reliability we want. 
Though few in number and s t a tistically a poor sample, the four successful flights 
by the Marshall Space Flight Center of the Saturn I first stage i nd icate that a 
reliable system can be developed. To do so, it r equir es a thorough enough under-
standing of the system so that i f anything troublesome shows up in the development 
program, it can be locat ed and corrected. Then again, we try to put enough margin 
into the system to make the operation reliable. 
We have had 19 consecutive successful Thor-Delta flights out of a total of 
20 tries. It is clear once agai n that it is possible to develop successful systems . 
The Mercury program is probably the best example of all . There were no 
mission fa ilures . Human life was involved. The main emphasis was on ensuring that 
each f light would be successful, whether it was manned, unmanned, or flew a monkey . 
In addition, countermeasures were always available so that in th~ event anything 
happened the astronaut would ge t out safely . Happily, the abort countermeasures 
never had to be used--and that really is our goa l , it seems to me in nuclear aero-
space systems . 
Another example appears in the successful space flights of the Goddard Space 
Flight Center, whi ch has had 30 successful flights out of 31 attempts . Thus, it is 
clear that methods exist for obtaining reliability . 
The problem with nuclear systems, however, is t ha t these systems will fly 
with hardware which has never been tested before --a rat her unique situation. In 
almost every other case, ground tests a re made of the hardware flown. In general, 
the philosophy is to test the hardware to be flown . Thi s philosophy cannot be fol -
lowed with nuclear systems and , hence, it will have to be ensured that , throughout 
the development program, each unit is exactly like the next and any damage appear-
ing in one is understood well enough to avoid s imilar damage in later units. 
The burden, then, is on the process of developing such reliabil ity, and I ' ll 
spend most of my time talking about thi s a rea of work . 
In order to achieve high reliability, we must have a good design, the test 
equipment and hardware must be built as designed , and a thorough development test 
program must be conducted including extensive testing under simulated space flight 
environmental conditions . First, we obviously must s t a rt with a good design . The 
entire system must be designed with as much margin as we can build into it and with 
redundancy for critical or uncertain operations and components . The problem is 
that we don't necessarily know how the system will operate under all conditions . 
Therefore, we don't really know where the margin must be added and how much is re -
quired to ensure r eliability, especially when we are in an early part of the pro -
gr am and are developing a new technology . 
Secondly, and I think this is where we get into many of our problems, we must 
be sure tha t the hardwa re is built as designed . I know all of you who a re r espons i-
ble fo r building systems or hardware are shocked at what frequently happens in pro-
curement and fabrication. Although we monitor and direct vendor s and contractors 
and succeed in catching some errors and deviations, some get through because we 
lack sufficient manpower and because we a re not necessarily, in all a rea s , better 
than the many competent industri al people participa ting on our programs . Many ex-
amples can be cited. For instance, a raw material delivered to us is certified to 
have a certain heat treatment; when checked fo r certain properties after fabrication , 
we f ind that it isn't the material we were supposed to have had to do the j ob . 
Obviously, the vendor of the raw material must have his quality control techniques 
reviewed. Such problems take us back to the supplier of the raw material--all the 
way through every one of the vendors, fabr icator s, and inspectors and through every 
s tep along the way if ~e a r e to ensure that the hardware delivered is, in fact , as 
designed . 
There i s f requently a feeling that quality assurance need not start in an 
early research and development phase of a program. I don 't agree . I think the 
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fault in this concept is that as we establish a design, every result must be able 
to be correlated with certain reasoning and certain things which happen in the sys -
tem. There may be anomalies ~n the results from different systems, and we must be 
able to track back to ascertain that the piece of hardware we started with is every-
where the same. In addition, it must be recognized that every bit of data must 
contribute to the setting of specifications, to establishing quality control pro-
cedures, and to proving out the design, especially when comparatively few systems 
are to be built. I think it is a real problem. It requires that we start quality 
assurance efforts very early in research and development. 
In addition, we must not fail to recognize that our quality assurance tech-
niques themselves require research. There are many areas of inspection and quality 
control that are not yet established. We don't always know how to measure the 
inclusions in a weld. We don't always know how to ensure the physical properties 
which we want over the full range of conditions required. Where there are thick 
sections, X-rays may not always be satisfactory; means must then be found both for 
inspecting such sections and tracing them through the fabrication process in order 
to ensure that we have in fact, even with prototypes, a way of building hardware 
as designed. All this work, it seems to me, must start in the research and develop-
ment phase of the program. 
It is, in addition, necessary that a comprehensive analysis and development 
test program on all system components and subsystems be conducted in a program 
leading to full system tests so that all the phenomena encountered are thoroughly 
understood. This development work must include full system tests on the ground 
under simulated space fl ight conditions. Some feel that it is too difficult to 
test nuclear systems under simulated space conditions and that because of the cost 
this step should be skipped. Thus the system goes from component and system tests 
under nonsimulated conditions directly to flight. I don't believe, however, that 
the full system simulated environmental tests can be skipped. Such tests are made 
on every other system; why not on nuclear systems? Nuclear systems are not simple; 
they are not easier to develop than other systems; they involve as much or more 
test work. There must be a clear, comprehensive test program that includes every 
step able to provide assurance that the end item will operate as intended. 
I don't believe there are any short cuts in these developments. We cannot 
plan on any luck. We must build success into the system during development, and we 
must build it in by including every facility, every piece of test equipment, and 
every test that will help to ensure successful operations. The development time 
will not be longer with such a program; the time will be shorter in terms of de-
livering the thing we want. Nor will the cost be any greater with such a program. 
Rather, it will lead to success that would not be assured by any short-cut approach. 
In the hearings before the House Appropriations Committee just a few weeks 
ago, a rather interesting question was asked by Congressman Thomas, Chairman of the 
Independent Offices Subcommittee, with which NASA works. This question was asked 
of Dr. Robert Gilruth, Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center: "To what do you 
attribute your main success, Doctor? I think the outstanding thing in my lifetime 
has been the Mercury program that you gentlemen put on so successfully. You did 
not lose even a monkey, much less a human being." Dr. Gilruth replied, "I think it 
is the great care on the part of the government personnel and skill on the contrac-
tors', which, in this case, were McDonnell Aircraft for the spacecraft and General 
Dynamics for the booster--the great care, checkout, and testing and retesting, 
going as far as we possibly could in assuring it would work when we tried it. Even 
when you do all this you cannot always guarantee success." Later in the discussion, 
Mr. James E. Webb, the NASA Administrator, added, '~ou see, one of the things that 
is so essential in these matters is never to proceed, when something shows up that 
you do not understand, until you really understand it and know what the cause of 
any particular phenomenon or difficulty is. I think Dr. Gilruth, perhaps more than 
any other person, has been the driving force to make absolutely sure that nothing 
unknown will be permitted, that you must really identify the cause of some occur-
rence before you proceed to the next step." 
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This, I think, is the NASA philosophy. It does lead to successful systems 
as indicated by the Mercury program and the several others I mentioned. Hopefully, 
the same philosophy will be used in nuclear programs. Even though it may appear to 
delay the programs at first, it will actually give successful completion in the 
shortest possible time, and, I am convinced, at the least cost . 
Incidentally, in the Mercury program and later in these House Appropriation 
Subcommittee hearings, Dr. Gilruth made the point that in order to ensure the re-
quired booster reliability, the Atlas boosters delivered for the Mercury program 
were different f rom military boosters. The parts were carefully tracked through 
fabrication and assemb ly ; more severe requir ements were put on the parts than on 
those for military use, and the cos t of the system went up by about 30 percent, I 
believe he said. But the point is that the program ran successfully, and every 
mission was a successful one. Let me give you an example of the requirement to ex-
plain every detected flaw. On Cooper's flight, there was an inverter and 0 . 05 - g 
s ignal problem. Months afte r the flight, tests we re still being run to figure out 
what went wrong in the electrical system, even though it was known that no Mercury 
flights were to follow. Detailed explanations must be available for everything 
that happens in a te st or a fl ight. I believe thi s applie s as well to ground test -
ing. I agree also with Dr. Gilruth that no matter how hard you try, there may still 
be difficulties that you won't f ind. You do your full system tests on the ground 
and your f light tests as part of the development program to find these trouble s . 
When you f l y an operationa l system, you should have worked a ll of those bugs out . 
I will only mention a few other areas which, I think from a systems approach, 
must be developed at an early time. These include all aspects of ground checkout 
at the launch s ite . A means must be developed to check the vehicle out and ensure 
that every sys tem is working properly . The range safe t y system must also be checked 
out to be sure that the sensors and the transmitted data it will have to read will, 
indeed, give the kind of information that is needed. This is a very large and im-
portant overall system development problem . 
All these things I have talked about are project responsibilities. No inde-
pendent safety committee looks deeply into this part of the program. The project 
establishes the way it wan t s to work and the way the system is to be developed. 
The success of the progr am depends upon the serious a ttitude of the people who are 
responsible for the development of the system . Beyond thiS, however, because we 
can't a lways be assured that every piece will wor k as intended on a fl i ght, we apply 
countermeasures. In nuclear sy stems, the part icular hardware will not have been 
tested before. We, therefore , try to postulat e anything that can happen anywhere 
along the operating cycle - - in the shipping of the reactor to the Cape, the assembly 
of the reactor with the rest of the system, its installation on the vehicle, the 
initial boost phase, along the trajectory, and after operation. Everything must be 
considered. We then postulate every possible accident that could occur, and we try 
to devise a countermeasure for each one . Hopefully it i s a passive countermeasure, 
but we can't always do that . Sometimes we need ac tive countermeasures. We must 
then go off on a new development program to deve lop the countermeasures, fo llowing 
the same philosophy as on the bas ic system itself. 
As I have said, I am concerned that some of the things we talk about as ac tive 
countermeasures in these nuclear sys t ems will have some effect on our ability to 
successful l y operate the basic system. We haven't yet reached the point of making 
a ll the necessary tradeoffs, but they will have to be made . Some judgments must be 
made, and some risks must be accepted as long as we can show that the probability 
of an incident is small. 
Now, this is the one area, to my mind, that needs some safe ty review. It 
should not be a project review, but it should not be a review whose entire purpose 
i s to say, "No, don't fly ." It has to be a review that is constructive . It must 
look a t the problems associated with the entire sys tem and at its reliability , 
especia lly it s countermeasure reliability . It will not follow the same ground rules 
as the ACRS review of ground reactor systems . I believe the ACRS has established 
an enviable record in ensuring the safety of ground systems, but we are talking now 
about a different k ind of envir onmental situation where different technologies a re 
required . 
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How does one obtain a s in g le review when there a re so many different groups 
involved? NASA i s responsible for the miss i on, the AEC and NASA for developing 
the sys t ems, and the Air Force fo r the r a n ge a nd the l a unch a rea (if launch is from 
the o ld Cape Canaveral area; NASA is responsible i f it is f rom the new Merritt 
I s l a nd l aunc h a rea ). A coordina ted review is, therefore, extremely important . Each 
agency h as some review function, but, i f we went through a ll of them one by one, we 
might neve r fly . There must be some pulling together of all these g roups to review 
the safe t y of the sys t em . From a technical point of view, several agencies were in -
volved in the review of SNAP - 9A system safety and potential hazards . The Division 
of Reac tor Deve l opme nt and the Division of Licensing and Regulation in the AEC drew 
on experts from the different agencies in their particular fields of competence . 
Sand i a was deeply invo l ved in this program of testing as well as Cornell Aeronauti-
cal L~boratories a nd v a riou s other groups. I think it was a very constructive 
exe rci se . But the fact i s , even after going through all this review, we couldn't 
have at the launch s ite a whole committee trying to make decisions . One man will 
have to be delega ted to speak for the project and make the very final judgments with-
in a broad framewo r k of specifications that the review committee presents . One man 
must have the au thority to make the deciSion, and he will have to be responsible. 
He \vill have to be a very competent man with a real understanding of the responsi -
bili ty that he will t a ke on . 
In summary , I wou l d like to say that I believe that nuclear systems can be 
developed to be reliable . In some ways, they are s impler than the systems we are 
Ho r k ing Hith now--simpler than the chemical combustion rocket systems, the solar 
cell sys tems, e tc. I believe we c a n apply countermeasures, but these will have to 
be applied with judgment t o ensure max imum reliability and overall safety. I be -
lieve also we will need some kind of an integrated interagency safety review. This 
is the basis upon which we will establish a nuclear space capability for the country 
that will permit us to exp lore in areas that we would not otherwise be able to 
approach. 
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